Oy! LiveScience touts panpsychism as the solution to the hard problem of consciousness
Panpsychism makes a sneaky return
Another panpsychist flogs a dead theory
A BBC show on panpsychism once again shows that there’s no “there” there
...And so on. More can be found on his blog. But to sum up with passages from the last link:
(This post was last modified: 2020-01-10, 06:01 PM by Will.)
Panpsychism makes a sneaky return
Another panpsychist flogs a dead theory
A BBC show on panpsychism once again shows that there’s no “there” there
...And so on. More can be found on his blog. But to sum up with passages from the last link:
Quote:If you’re sick of panpsychism by now, you can skip this post and the podcast below. But it’s not going away soon, I think, given the vociferous nature and arrant careerism of its proponents...I’ll soon stop posting about this, but I wanted readers to see how deeply wrong an idea can be (maybe “woo-ish and untestable” is a better characterization than “wrong”) and still be popular. I am still baffled by its popularity, though nobody I respect has adhered to this idea...[proponents don't] say what it actually means for an electron to have “experience”. Sure, they have spin and move around, but in what sense is that “experience” if they don’t “experience” it? What he’s saying is more or less what he told Sean Carroll on the podcast I posted yesterday: all matter has “properties,” like mass and spin and velocity, and if you call those properties “consciousness,” then yes, everything is conscious. But then he’s made no advance beyond pure physics. And this doesn’t solve the second problem: how do the rudimentary consciousnesses of the molecular bits of our brain somehow come together to produce full consciousness in the whole organ: consciousness in which we have qualia—feelings, perceptions, and sensations? This remains a mystery that neither Goff nor Morch appear to solve....the Hard Problem of Panpsychism [is]: How do the semisconscious bits of brain stuff combine to make a brain conscious, but the semiconscious bits of tables and rocks don’t? These philosophers don’t tell us, and so there’s a gaping hole in their “theory”—if you want to call an untestable and largely semantic issue a “theory”.