Consciousness: Combining views of a Philosopher, a Theologian, and a Physicist

Comparing Robert Corrington, Yu Young-Mo, and Henry Stapp

Wang-Eun Serl

I contend that consciousness is an essential part of every entity so that it may make connections to other entities. No matter how simply an entity is, the entity has its relations to other entities by its consciousness. My argument is based on the four issues of consciousness: the possibility of the non-physical, the necessity of subjectivity, the fundamental structure of consciousness, and the significance of observation. The argument of this dissertation is a statement of possibility because of two conditions, the indemonstrability of the non-physical and the necessity of subjectivity. Assuming that consciousness is related to the non-physical, there is currently no way to prove the existence of consciousness because the non-physical can be neither measured nor observed. Also, if we take consciousness as subjectivity, we cannot notice from a third-person perspective if a certain entity has consciousness. The statement that every entity has consciousness is a statement of possibility, but Corrington, Yu Young-mo, and Stapp raise its probability of truth.