2021-11-10, 01:08 AM
The Impossibly Hard Problem of Consciousness
Prudence Louise
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Why Physicalism Is Failing as the Accepted Approach to Science
Prudence Louise
Quote:To explain a functional state requires specifying a mechanism that performs the function. Scientific reductionist explanations work on the principle that we can understand all phenomena by explaining their elementary parts. A description of the structure, the functions and the motion and interaction of those parts is all we need to completely explain any phenomena.
Quote:All these problems are only problems for the physicalist. Alternative metaphysics, like idealism, substance dualism or panpsychism all avoid the hard problem by denying causal closure. They accept the observation that consciousness is non-physical, and it’s causally effective, which means causal closure must be false.
Unlike the observations of consciousness and its causal powers, causal closure isn’t based on observations of the world. It’s a metaphysical commitment. Physicalism is confronting a problem created by its philosophical commitments being in conflict with our observations of the world.
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Why Physicalism Is Failing as the Accepted Approach to Science
Quote:In response to criticism from physicists Sabine Hossenfelder and Sean Carroll, philosopher Philip Goff points out that panpsychism is not in conflict with physics. It offers a simpler view of physics than dualism, with fewer gaps than materialism (including physicalism).
Essentially, panpsychism offers a way for scientists to address human consciousness, as currently understood, without explaining it away as an illusion. It would allow them to say that if Zombie-Jane existed, she would be missing something critical that Jane has (and so does everything else, to at least some extent).
Whether that benefit makes panpsychism a better explanation of reality than idealism or dualism is a separate question. Each of these points of view has its own issues but the Zombie isn’t one of them.