Why Physicalism Is Wrong

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Philosopher Grant Bartley makes the argument in Philosophy Now.

Grant Bartley argues that to say the mind is physical is an abuse of language.
Quote:The most widely accepted attempt at describing the nature of embodied thought in this materialistic age is called physicalism. (It has a variant called materialism, but I’ll use the terms interchangeably.) There are many nuanced versions of physicalism, but in its basic form, it says that all the mental things – sensations, thoughts, ideas, all experiences – are really physical things: matter, energy and physical processes. But does such an idea make sense? Can it mean anything meaningful to say that the contents of minds are physical? I say no.

Let me start by saying that the debate about how to describe the nature of the mind is at its heart an argument about the proper language in which to do so. Although this might make the debate sound trivial or fussy, it is not. This is firstly because what we say about the mind will be fundamental for our understanding of the nature of reality, so to accurately describe the nature of the mind is not trivial but vital. Secondly, using the correct language is what makes the difference between describing something truthfully rather than falsely. And I want to say that describing the mind as ‘physical’ is a grossly false way of speaking about the mind that will hold metaphysics back for as long as people talk that way. In fact, I will argue that people can only believe physicalism because they haven’t thought hard enough about what its core ideas actually imply or they are using the term ‘physical’ so imprecisely that it’s meaningless.
Read more here:
https://philosophynow.org/issues/126/Why...m_is_Wrong
(This post was last modified: 2018-06-01, 05:04 AM by Ninshub.)
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"Not convinced? Consider then instead that core to our concept of physical is that a physical thing exists as part of a world of physical causation that operates independently of our experience of it. That is to say, our experience of the physical world is as if that world is joined together through the behaviour of things external to our minds. For example, we assume, often implicitly, but sometimes explicitly, that our experience of the physical world shows that it is not explainable in terms of it being simply one unconnected experience after another, but only in terms of laws that apply to physical objects that have an existence separate from our experience of them. For example, we can (usually) predict where and when a probe is going to land on Mars even when nobody is in contact with it; or we can come to perceive light that originated from quasars long before there was conscious life on Earth, or even an Earth; or we can leave a computer running an app while we’re out; or assume the fridge is still working when we’re not looking at it; or we see a ball disappear behind a wall, and then reappear on the other side as it rolls along; and so on. These ideas all rely on the idea that physical things exist independent of minds. So by definition, a physical object is not only or purely what is in the contents of experience. This means, conversely, that anything that is purely in a mind, is not physical by definition! So, again, mental things are not physical."

The final two sentences are incoherent. Can someone explain what he means?

~~ Paul
If the existence of a thing is indistinguishable from its nonexistence, we say that thing does not exist. ---Yahzi
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(2018-06-07, 11:05 PM)Max_B Wrote: He's seems to be saying saying that it's accepted that physical things appear to have an existence independent of the mind, and he is therefore suggesting that what is in the mind can be different to what is physical. He then seems to be saying that if mind can have things in it that are different to what is physical, then what is is the mind, cannot be physical, (or cannot be just/purely physical).

We agree that there are physical processes that go on without our being conscious of them. Therefore there are physical processes that are not "mental" or at least not completely "mental." I think this is what he means by

"... a physical object is not only or purely what is in the contents of experience."


Although that is one convoluted sentence. Then he goes on to say that a purely mental object cannot therefore be physical:

"This means, conversely, that anything that is purely in a mind, is not physical by definition! So, again, mental things are not physical."

The problem here is that claiming that there are things that are "purely in a mind" is begging the question. He just invented a thing that is purely in mind = not physical and then claims he's proven that mental things aren't physical. Why should we believe that "purely in a mind" picks out anything that exists?

~~ Paul
If the existence of a thing is indistinguishable from its nonexistence, we say that thing does not exist. ---Yahzi
(This post was last modified: 2018-06-07, 11:43 PM by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos.)
It's easy to yammer out a philisophical opinion, the rub comes if he can prove this experimentally. I have high confidence probably not.
(This post was last modified: 2018-06-08, 01:41 AM by Steve001.)
(2018-06-07, 11:42 PM)Paul C. Anagnostopoulos Wrote: We agree that there are physical processes that go on without our being conscious of them. Therefore there are physical processes that are not "mental" or at least not completely "mental." I think this is what he means by

"... a physical object is not only or purely what is in the contents of experience."


Although that is one convoluted sentence. Then he goes on to say that a purely mental object cannot therefore be physical:

"This means, conversely, that anything that is purely in a mind, is not physical by definition! So, again, mental things are not physical."

The problem here is that claiming that there are things that are "purely in a mind" is begging the question. He just invented a thing that is purely in mind = not physical and then claims he's proven that mental things aren't physical. Why should we believe that "purely in a mind" picks out anything that exists?

~~ Paul

Yes. Ironic given that his aim was to expose an "abuse of language".
(2018-06-08, 01:31 AM)Steve001 Wrote: It's easy to yammer out a philisophical opinion, the rub comes if he can prove this experimentally. I have high confidence probably not.

It's also easy to dismiss things you have no understanding of and don't care to try to
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(2018-06-08, 02:21 AM)Dante Wrote: It's also easy to dismiss things you have no understanding of and don't care to try to

Ok Mister Dante, since you agree with him experimentally prove his position. I'd like to see such positive evidence.
(2018-06-08, 01:40 PM)Steve001 Wrote: Ok Mister Dante, since you agree with him experimentally prove his position. I'd like to see such positive evidence.

Try proving your position experimentally.
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