I told Brian in another thread that I hadn't "yet" responded to him in this thread, and, although that didn't seem to have stopped him from leaving (he has not visited us since declaring his absence), I figure it's worth acting on that implied intention to respond here anyway.
I have only a couple of points that I want to raise in response to the excellent article by Peter Suber which Brian shared in the opening post, other than noting that the article is clearly and cogently presented, and gives a great insight into what skepticism meant in its original form - versus the modern bastardisation of the philosophy.
My first point is that I share what seems to be
part of the basic premise of skepticism proper: that there are only a few things that we know with certainty, and that, on the rest, we must simply inquire perpetually in the hope that we eventually attain knowledge. Those few things that we can know with certainty are that we exist, that we are having experiences, and the nature of those experiences, where by knowing the "nature" of those experiences I mean as raw experiences per se, rather than as any knowledge/understanding of what underlies or causes the raw experiences as they present themselves to us: that is, we
know that we experience the "redness of red" as it presents itself to us, but we do not know
why we experience the redness of red nor
what that redness ultimately amounts to or is caused by. And here, too, I mean knowledge in the strictest sense of completely justified complete certainty.
Secondly, I had before even reading this article formed an argument against skepticism proper as is described in the section
Can the Skeptic Act?. The argument is introduced in that section as follows: "
dogmatists say that all action betrays the actor's faith or certitude, and that all speech betrays the speaker's faith or certitude, that something or another is the case. I could not write these words unless I had certitude that my pen was not a bomb triggered by use. I would not be writing unless I had the certitude that eyes could see and minds understand what I am saying. Nor could I say much in grammatical English without hiding an assertion of a fact or a belief." I was fascinated to read it in those terms because I have argued almost identically elsewhere that, for example, a person would not go for a walk unless s/he
believed that the ground was stable enough to support his/her weight, and was not liable to disintegrating and dropping the walker into a flaming mass of hot lava.
The author summarises the nuanced skeptical response to this, but whilst I agree that it is nuanced and thoughtful, I think that it ultimately fails. There simply is no way around having beliefs in this life: every choice we make reflects our beliefs, and every action (including "inaction") that we take is the result of a choice; and since (in)action is unavoidable, choices and thus beliefs are unavoidable. The skeptic may well wish to "split hairs" (as the author acknowledges) about the nature of those unavoidable beliefs, and whether or not they are truly "dogmatic", but my view is that a line between beliefs to which the skeptic "compulsorily assents" (as described in the article) and those which are properly "dogmatic" does not exist; there is only a continuum, and thus the skeptic cannot escape the inevitability that s/he holds beliefs proper, given the inevitabilities that s/he must act, that each act is a choice, and that choices are based on beliefs proper.
I think we can even frame it in these terms to get around the objections raised in the article: some beliefs are implicit (per the example I raised previously: one
implicitly believes that the ground on which one is walking is solid), and some are explicit. The skeptic may wish to argue: the sort of "unavoidable" beliefs to which you refer, and on which I base my choices, are implicit, and thus are non-dogmatic. But all it takes is to explicitly raise the belief in question
as a question, at which point the skeptic is forced to confront it and either explicitly affirm or deny it
as the basis of his/her choices, at which point it becomes explicit - whether affirmed or denied (as the
ongoing basis of decision-making). We can ask the skeptic outright: "Do you believe that the ground on which you are walking is solid and will support you without caving in and dropping you into a pit of lava? Yes or no?". The skeptic may wish to try to wriggle out of either an explicit affirmation or denial, but the answer will be clear when (if) s/he gets up to leave -
if s/he
chooses to do so. This could be done for any number of (implicit) beliefs, transforming them into explicit beliefs from which - as beliefs proper - the skeptic cannot escape.
Now, according to the author, "The skeptic's action may presuppose
realities, but not necessarily
beliefs." I think that the above makes it clear that
implicit "realities" can always be transformed into
explicit beliefs, and thus that this distinction does not help the skeptic in his/her claim to be free from (dogmatic) belief. Similarly, in listing possibilities in response to the argument that action "presupposes something" (a belief or set of beliefs according to me), the author includes this final possibility: "(5) it might be a dogmatic belief that the skeptic has not noticed or examined in herself. Before she is charged with hypocrisy or inconsistency, she should have a chance to judge it." OK, but once s/he has been given the chance to notice or examine the presupposition in question,
it then becomes an explicit belief (either affirmed or denied, as consistent with those choices which are based upon either its affirmation or denial), and
the skeptic can no longer claim that it is (merely) "involuntarily" assented to or otherwise
merely implicit or otherwise unexamined.
So, my view remains that whilst the skeptical response to this objection might be considered to be nuanced and thoughtful (and you'd need to read the article to see it in its proper context and detail), it ultimately doesn't hold up to scrutiny. Beliefs are unavoidable. Our actions (and acting is inevitable) are underlaid by choices (and choices too are inevitable) which are informed by beliefs, whether implicit or explicit, which, too, are thus inevitable.
And now a little word to the OP.
Brian:
affirm your belief in this forum by choosing to return, and then acting on that choice.
You know that
Sextus knows that you ought to... plus, where else can you discuss the philosophy of skepticism at the same time as NDEs, UFOs, experimental parapsychology, fairies, and COVID19 all in the same space??
