Psience Quest

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(2018-10-09, 09:21 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]What's your definition of Information? Perhaps starting from that vantage point we can move forward. Also perhaps some references/quotes from the authors you note. (For example if we're thinking of the same J.Kim.)
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/so...phers/kim/

Here's one take by the same Bob Doyle as in the above link.(the information philosopher) 

Quote: Information philosophy settles deep philosophical issues about absolute and relative identity. All material objects are self-identical, despite concerns about vague boundaries. All objects have relations with other objects that can be interpreted as relative identities. All objects are identical to other objects in some respects and different qua other respects.
Two numerically distinct objects can be perfectly identical (x = x) internally, if their intrinsici nformation content is identical. Relational (extrinsic) information with other objects and positions in space and time is ignored. The Greeks called intrinsic information pros heauto or idios poion. Aristotle and the Stoics called this the peculiar qualities of an individual
.
They distinguished peculiar properties from the material substrate, which they called hupokeimenon, the "underlying. Extrinsic information is found in an object's relations with other objects and space and time. The Greek terms were pros ta alla, toward others, and pros ti pos echon, relatively disposed.

Just as the mind is like software in the brain hardware, the abstract information in a material object is the same kind of immaterial stuff as the information in an abstract entity, a concept or a "non-existent object." Some philosophers say that such immaterial things "subsist," rather than exist.

Broadly speaking, the distinction between concrete and abstract objects corresponds to the distinction between the material and the ideal. Ideas in minds are immaterial. They need the matter of the brain to be embodied and some kind of energy to be communicated to other minds. But they are not themselves matter or energy. Those "eliminativists" who believe the natural world contains only material things deny the existence of ideas and immaterial information.
The bits of information are the logical atoms of Russell and Wittgenstein.

And information philosophy is a "correspondence theory."
Think of the isomorphisms between John Wheeler's "its" and "bits."
[M]atter, which we can now define only as that which satisfies the laws of physics, may be spirit insofar as... the spirit conforms to the mental operations of distinguishing and objectifying. We can explain causally... precisely to the degree to which spiritual reality can be objectified; in this objectified form it is called... matter.

[I]n the history of philosophy this identity has been variously expressed by asserting that the final reality is spiritual; what... we call matter is the mode in which this final reality is perceived by itself as alienated from itself.

--C.F. von Weizsäcker
(2018-09-28, 07:21 PM)tim Wrote: [ -> ]Unite us all until oblivion. What's the point of that ?

http://www.bbc.com/reel/video/p06wv1q3/w...-pointless
(2019-01-02, 11:55 PM)malf Wrote: [ -> ]http://www.bbc.com/reel/video/p06wv1q3/w...-pointless

Malf, I'm not quite sure why you've taken it upon yourself to recommend (to me) a course of positive thinking. I can only assume my interest in NDE's has lead you to believe I have some kind of desperate need to comfort (delude) myself against the harsh reality of life? Thanks so much for thinking of me, Malf ! The depth and value of that little "homily" will give me immense comfort when my time comes.
Like a fool, when I'm about to take my last breath,  I will strive to cultivate thoughts of love and joy as I face eternal extinction ! [Image: Smiley20.gif]
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