Psience Quest

(2017-10-05, 06:45 AM)Laird Wrote: [ -> ]Interesting. Thanks. One of the reasons I asked is because I recently had a discussion about consciousness with a friend of mine - a very intelligent guy, was dux of our high school, but chose the path of a medical specialist (in intensive care), and thus has had a heavy academic and professional life without devoting much time to philosophical matters. Anyway, I've since then been trying to pin down which theory of mind matches his views best, and settled on reductionism... but given now that you say that reductionism denies real qualia, then even this doesn't fit, since he's not an idiot and doesn't deny the reality of consciousness.

Perhaps if I share his views with you, you will be able to label him neatly and tidily and put him in a little box.

Basically, he is reductionist to the extent that he believes that reality consists in layers of abstraction determined by the base layer of physics. i.e. physics fully determines the next abstract layer of chemistry, which fully determines the next abstract layer of biology, which fully determines the next abstract layer of consciousness (which as I said he recognises as real). So, he's not an emergentist, because he doesn't think there's anything truly novel or irreducible about consciousness - consciousness and its contents are all implicit in and reducible to the base layer of physics - but, and here's the kicker, nor does he appear to be an epiphenomenalist, because he believes that consciousness can causally affect itself.

He justifies this with an analogy to weather. Here's how I put it to him in a recent email trying to mirror his views back to him to check whether I understood him correctly (he hasn't responded yet but I think I've got this right):

In our face-to-face discussion, you used the analogy of weather. I understand that what you mean to say by this is that just as we can say that at its level of abstraction, weather phenomena cause other weather phenomena (e.g., the evaporation of water vapour off the ocean causes coastal clouds, which the wind causes to blow inland, and which causes rainfall upon the land) - a causal description that is an abstraction that ultimately reduces to a causal description in terms of basic physics (sub-atomic particles, the four fundamental forces, stochastic quantum mechanical events, etc) - so we can say that consciousness and all its associated mental phenomena do, at their level of abstraction, cause other mental phenomena (e.g., when I thought such-and-such, it caused me to become angry), even though - likewise - this causal description is ultimately an abstraction that reduces to a causal description in terms of basic physics.

Does my friend's view on consciousness seem to fit any existing philosophy of mind of which you're aware, Titus? Would you agree that "reductionism" is the best fit? Does it seem coherent? I offered a couple of arguments against it in my email but would like to get your own take before sharing them.

This clearly is reductionism or reductive materialism. He does not deny "consciousness" in the cognitive sense of awareness, but he does deny consciousness in the sense of irreducible subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia. This is basically the position defended by Daniel C. Dennett.

In general, one could say that reductionists accept the validity of any concepts as long as these don't imply anything irreducible to purely physical processes.

(2017-10-05, 07:01 AM)Titus Rivas Wrote: [ -> ]This clearly is reductionism or reductive materialism. He does not deny "consciousness" in the cognitive sense of awareness, but he does deny consciousness in the sense of irreducible subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia. This is basically the position defended by Daniel C. Dennett.

In general, one could say that reductionists accept the validity of any concepts as long as these don't imply anything irreducible to purely physical processes.

Thanks, Titus. In your view, does anything incoherent follow (directly or indirectly) from his denial of the irreducibility of subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia? Or does the incoherence lie elsewhere? As I said, I have my own view on this, but am curious to first probe yours.

P.S. Even though this view is reductionism or reductionist materialism, given that it doesn't deny the reality of consciousness, is it not, too, a type of dualism?

(2017-10-05, 07:07 AM)Laird Wrote: [ -> ]Thanks, Titus. In your view, does anything incoherent follow (directly or indirectly) from his denial of the irreducibility of subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia? Or does the incoherence lie elsewhere? As I said, I have my own view on this, but am curious to first probe yours.

Well, either subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia are REAL (as such) and therefore irreducible, or they are NOT real (as such), but simply an abstract way of talking about (or shorthand for) non-phenomenal processes. In the second case, what we call phenomenal experiences really can be reduced to non-phenomenal neurological processes.

It is not incoherent to claim that you're a philosophical zombie without phenomenal consciousness (because that is part of the definition of a philosophical zombie), but you can't claim you're a zombie but still really experience things (phenomenally). That would be incoherent. Either you do experience something phenomenally or you don't really experience anything, but not both at the same time.

(2017-10-05, 07:11 AM)Laird Wrote: [ -> ]P.S. Even though this view is reductionism or reductionist materialism, given that it doesn't deny the reality of consciousness, is it not, too, a type of dualism?

No, because reductive materialism is incompatible with any type of ontological dualism. So a better word for his view is: incoherent .

(2017-10-05, 11:05 AM)Titus Rivas Wrote: [ -> ]Well, either subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia are REAL (as such) and therefore irreducible

And there's the rub: my friend doesn't accept that the latter follows from the former. He thinks that consciousness can be both real and reducible, and he wants an argument from me as to why I deny this (to me it's self-explanatory, so it's hard to construct an argument - but I ended up coming up with a couple of them).

(2017-10-05, 05:46 PM)Laird Wrote: [ -> ]And there's the rub: my friend doesn't accept that the latter follows from the former. He thinks that consciousness can be both real and reducible, and he wants an argument from me as to why I deny this (to me it's self-explanatory, so it's hard to construct an argument - but I ended up coming up with a couple of them).

Well, either he is wrong (for the reason I've just given) or he simply uses the word "consciousness" as a word for "higher levels of cognition" and like Dennett rejects the existence of qualia.  
In that case, you're simply talking about different topics.

OK, so, Titus, we've established in this thread and another your arguments against (1) epiphenominalism, (2) panpsychism, and (3) reductionism. Now, how about emergentism? Do you think any form of emergentism is tenable (e.g. Orch-OR)? Why / why not? Again, I have my own views but would like to hear yours. (Feel free to reply in a new thread if you think the discussion warrants one).

(2017-10-11, 07:37 AM)Laird Wrote: [ -> ]OK, so, Titus, we've established in this thread and another your arguments against (1) epiphenominalism, (2) panpsychism, and (3) reductionism. Now, how about emergentism? Do you think any form of emergentism is tenable (e.g. Orch-OR)? Why / why not? Again, I have my own views but would like to hear yours. (Feel free to reply in a new thread if you think the discussion warrants one).

For now, Laird, I'll simply reply here. 

I don't think any form of emergentism is tenable. I distinguish between the following four main types of emergentism: 

- Mind-brain holism of the type defended by Roger Sperry; qualia would be real, but simply consist of a higher level of organization of the physical brain.

- Phenomenological holism: the mind would be one with the body as a whole, not just with the brain. This may be related to Aristotelian and Thomistic hylomorphism, but most contemporary phenomenologists would hold that the supposed unity of mind and body is produced by natural, physiological processes that would not involve a mysterious soul, let alone supernatural intervention.

– Property dualism: the brain would possess certain irreducible, emergent properties that can't be considered physical. This is at present the most popular type of dualism within the philosophy of mind. 

– Emergent substance dualism: there is a irreducible (semi)substantial self – in the ontological sense of substantial, but it is produced by the brain, a theory proposed by scholars like Karl Popper and William Hasker. 

The Orch-OR theory might be formulated as a specific type of property dualism or emergent substance dualism, as far as I know. It simply seems to be a theory about the specific mechanisms behind the supposed emergence of consciousness.

My general philosophical problem with any type of emergentism is that it does not make sense to believe that subjective experience emerges from something physical (the brain) that itself lacks all capacity to undergo qualia. There is no such problem if we suppose that subjective experiences may occur to an entity that has the ontological capacity to undergo them, namely an ontologically substantial non-physical psyche. 

In the case of mind-brain holism, I find it quite obviously untrue that subjective experiences somehow exist as a higher level of the physical brain. This would make sense if subjective experiences could be seen as abstractions of wholly non-subjective processes in the brain, but the reason to postulate emergence is precisely that they can't be reduced to such processes.

In the case of phenomenological holism, we see an empirical problem, namely that consciousness obviously is not directly linked to all parts of the body. In fact, that is why we have a nervous system that connects the senses and muscles to our brain ;-) Phenomenological holism seems to fail to correct our subjective impression that we really feel things in our body parts, by our knowledge of the fact that we only do so because of neurological transference of stimuli to the brain. In that sense, phenomenological holism has been conclusively refuted by empirical science. 

In the case of property dualism, we're confronted by the logical problem that a completely physical brain would possess non-physical properties. Either the brain is not wholly physical or it is, but it can't be both at the same time. This is actually a conclusive argument for me. Besides, the notion of a partially non-physical brain seems to be in itself incoherent, because in what respect could the non-physical brain properties be properties of the brain as a physical system? In what respect would it be correct to speak of a “brain” in the everyday, physical sense, if we're addressing its supposed non-physical properties?

In the case of emergent substance dualism, the logical problem is even greater. The brain is a non-substantial (in the ontological sense) physical system and we're supposed to believe that its processes can create a (semi)substantial, non-physical new domain outside itself. This would amount to a creation out of nothing, as it would not involve creation of new properties or levels within the brain itself. Now, traditionally the creation of a substantial ontological domain has been ascribed to an eternal creator aka God. We may not know everything there is to know about the brain, but we can be certain that it is not a divine creator. 

Thank you for your very clear, comprehensive and informative reply, Titus! The quote below is one I thoroughly endorse based on my own views, so thank you for supplying it!

(2017-10-14, 08:55 PM)Titus Rivas Wrote: [ -> ]My general philosophical problem with any type of emergentism is that it does not make sense to believe that subjective experience emerges from something physical (the brain) that itself lacks all capacity to undergo qualia. There is no such problem if we suppose that subjective experiences may occur to an entity that has the ontological capacity to undergo them, namely an ontologically substantial non-physical psyche.

Regarding this:

(2017-10-14, 08:55 PM)Titus Rivas Wrote: [ -> ]The Orch-OR theory might be formulated as a specific type of property dualism or emergent substance dualism, as far as I know. It simply seems to be a theory about the specific mechanisms behind the supposed emergence of consciousness.

Based on a (very old, to the tune of 1994, so potentially out of date) paper of Stuart Hameroff's which I recently read, I understand his claim to be that his theory of Orch-OR is a bridge between reductionism and interactionist dualism (he writes of this explicitly: "[the] reductionism/dualism dichotomy may potentially be resolved by views which contend that consciousness has a distinct quality, but one which emerges from brain processes which can be accounted for by natural science").

In particular, his theory entails that the emergent mind can then interact with and influence the physicality out of which it emerged (again, with me quoting from this paper, Stuart Hameroff writes: "Emergent phenomena can exert downward modulation on lower-level interactions to provide reverberation, feedback, error correction and reward").

But yes, I would argue against this theory (and, indeed, all emergentist theories) exactly as you do in your quote above. Orch-OR seems to be a very clever synthesis of various biological and physics phenomena, in particular those of quantum physics, but regardless of its cleverness, as you rightly put it, "it does not make sense to believe that subjective experience emerges from something physical (the brain) that itself lacks all capacity to undergo qualia".

I must say that it's encouraging to have found an academic (you) who so cogently argues the case for the solution to the mind-body problem that I find most persuasive. Thank you for sharing yourself with us in this thread.