I've reached out to Rupert Sheldrake about an interview for this forum, and he's kindly agreed to a brief one by e-mail. I am to have a list of ten questions to him within two weeks, and I thought I'd check in if anyone here had something they'd like to ask. I can't think of a fairer way to do this than "first come, first served." As I have at least one question of my own, however, consider there to be nine slots open
As I said, I need to send the list along within two weeks, and due to a busy schedule I'll need to send them out a little bit sooner than that, so please get your questions in by August 22.
When you say May, you mean August right? Or is this post something coming from the past or the future?
That's awesome that you're doing this, though!
Caveat: I have not read any of Rupert's books, though I am a big fan of, and have read up on, some of his experiments, especially those with Pam Smart's dog Jaytee (and the misrepresentations of it by Richard Wiseman), and have watched / listened to several of his talks/interviews. Given this caveat, there may be an obvious answer to this question lurking in material of Rupert's which I have not read, in which case, please feel free to simply link me in or refer me to that rather than wasting a question on this.
That said, here is my question:
What ontology (in the sense of a philosophy of mind) does Rupert subscribe to? Is he, for example, a substance dualist; does he believe that mind and matter are distinct, and that God, as pure mind, emanated via an act of creative will both a material reality and the individual souls (minds) which inhabit that reality, placing the souls into some relationship with both Himself and that material reality? Or is he more of an idealist, holding that there is no material reality; that the so-called "material" reality is merely some sort of illusion dreamt up in the mind of God? And (unless this be taken as a separate question, in which case, I am over my quota so feel free to exclude it): is there any way in which he considers his overall ontology to be testable or otherwise subject to confirmation/falsifiability? Finally (OK, OK, I'm really over my quota now): in what way(s) does his overall ontology support, or in what way(s) is it consistent with, the results of his parapsychological research?
(2019-08-13, 04:26 AM)Laird Wrote: [ -> ]Caveat: I have not read any of Rupert's books, though I am a big fan of, and have read up on, some of his experiments, especially those with Pam Smart's dog Jaytee (and the misrepresentations of it by Richard Wiseman), and have watched / listened to several of his talks/interviews. Given this caveat, there may be an obvious answer to this question lurking in material of Rupert's which I have not read, in which case, please feel free to simply link me in or refer me to that rather than wasting a question on this.
That said, here is my question:
What ontology (in the sense of a philosophy of mind) does Rupert subscribe to? Is he, for example, a substance dualist; does he believe that mind and matter are distinct, and that God, as pure mind, emanated via an act of creative will both a material reality and the individual souls (minds) which inhabit that reality, placing the souls into some relationship with both Himself and that material reality? Or is he more of an idealist, holding that there is no material reality; that the so-called "material" reality is merely some sort of illusion dreamt up in the mind of God? And (unless this be taken as a separate question, in which case, I am over my quota so feel free to exclude it): is there any way in which he considers his overall ontology to be testable or otherwise subject to confirmation/falsifiability? Finally (OK, OK, I'm really over my quota now): in what way(s) does his overall ontology support, or in what way(s) is it consistent with, the results of his parapsychological research?
Wow! That's more than one question. I'd simply ask why he has no incontrovertible evidence?
(2019-08-13, 01:05 PM)Steve001 Wrote: [ -> ]Wow! That's more than one question. I'd simply ask why he has no incontrovertible evidence?
I think the word "incontrovertible" is difficult, because if somebody controverts something, it can't be incontrovertible. It's like asking why there isn't any indisputable evidence. The explanation could be that some people will dispute anything.
There's obviously an interesting question there, but it needs to be expressed carefully.
(2019-08-13, 01:11 PM)Chris Wrote: [ -> ]There's obviously an interesting question there, but it needs to be expressed carefully.
You mistake Steve's attempted witty one liners for a serious question. Let's not ruin his shtick.
(2019-08-13, 03:35 PM)Silence Wrote: [ -> ]You mistake Steve's attempted witty one liners for a serious question. Let's not ruin his shtick.
Shhh. Why in the heck should anyone care what personal positions he has? I thought you all want confirmation.
(2019-08-13, 01:11 PM)Chris Wrote: [ -> ]I think the word "incontrovertible" is difficult, because if somebody controverts something, it can't be incontrovertible. It's like asking why there isn't any indisputable evidence. The explanation could be that some people will dispute anything.
There's obviously an interesting question there, but it needs to be expressed carefully.
Incontrovertible to the point where reasonable people would not argue otherwise. An example would be plate tectonics.
Though I was teasing Laird a bit for asking about Sheldrake's philosophical opinions it was a hard yet simple question I asked. If he has no answer to that question then there's no reason I can see for concerning oneself about his existential perspectives other than out of curiosity. Does he know something no one else does? I doubt it. Another question that comes to mind is why Sheldrake posited morphic fields and resonances? I know he thunked up the idea decades ago but still why?
(2019-08-13, 06:52 PM)Steve001 Wrote: [ -> ]Incontrovertible to the point where reasonable people would not argue otherwise. ...
I think that only displaces the argument to the question of who is reasonable. But still ...