Psience Quest

Quote: The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The presentation is divided into three parts:first, I argue against Searle’s contention that the mental is a macro-feature of a physical system in the same way that solidity and photosynthesis are. Second, I criticize Searle’s argument that the ontological irreducibility of consciousness is a trivial matter. Third, I defend Nagel’s argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds, which goes against the basic tenets of Searle’s ontology. I hope to show that Searle’s account of the unity of the world is implausible and possibly even inconsistent.

Note, however, that I do not argue that Searle is wrong to hold that the world is one, but that his understanding of the world’s unity is untenable.