In defence of free will: Difference between revisions

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→‎But how does it work?: Majorly overhauled this section to introduce, and frame it in terms of, *reasons*.
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A (set of) question(s) that often comes up at this point is:
A (set of) question(s) that often comes up at this point is:


:But ''how'' are these choices made? We have a person and that person's environment as "cause" (eliding for convenience the distinction between causes and conditions), and then we have the choice's outcome as "effect". Surely, though, there is some sort of ''process'' by which the choice is made; some way of ''breaking it down'' into a series of steps?
:But ''how'' are these choices made? In the case of determinism, we can explain how any given deterministic process works by breaking it down very exactingly in terms of the laws of physics, and for randomness, even though we can't exactly break it down like that, physics ''does'' give us a good reason to believe that in certain contexts it is applicable, and why. Can similar explanations be offered for how a free will choice is made?


One plausible answer is that, whilst a decision often ''can'' be broken down into a series of steps (as introspection reveals), at a certain point, the decision simply becomes irreducible. In this sense, the decision is simply an ''holistic'' function of a person's will given the context in which s/he finds him/herself. We might observe, for example, that in making choice C, person P took the steps S1, followed by S2, and then S3, in which S1 was a consideration of the options available, S2 was a narrowing down of options, and S3 was the - potentially provisional - commitment to one of the options - the choice itself. In considering S3, we might find that although to an extent it can be broken down a little, at some point it becomes irreducible: the person, given the full context of his/her situation, simply ''holistically and contingently makes the choice''. At that level, the choice cannot be broken down any further.
A plausible answer is that just as a deterministic causal process can be broken down into a set of - themselves irreducible - laws which explain how the process works, freely willed choices and behaviour can be broken down into a set of - themselves irreducible - ''reasons'' which explain how the choice or behaviour were willed by the agent who willed them.


Notice that whilst that irreducible choice itself could have been made otherwise (and thus is not ''necessitated''), it is also not disconnected from the context - both inner and outer to the chooser - in which it occurs (and thus is not ''arbitrary''): indeed, unless the chooser ''freely chooses'' to make an explicitly "random" choice, the decision is made in part on the basis of - and thus is causally (though, through the person's will, in a contingent rather than a necessitated sense) connected to - that context.
In this sense, reasons and the discipline of psychology are to free will choices what (respectively) laws and the discipline of physics are to causal determinism.


Another point worth making is that on this view, S1 and S2 are themselves contingent expressions of the chooser's free will, and are thus ''themselves'' free choices (which break down, too, into fundamentally irreducible free choices), and, in this sense, are no different in nature than S3 and (the abstracted aggregate) C.
We might observe, for example, that in making choice C, person P took the steps S1, followed by S2, and then S3, in which S1 was a consideration of the options available, S2 was a narrowing down of options, and S3 was the - potentially provisional - commitment to one of the options - the choice itself. Though it might not be apparent to others (and sometimes not fully understood by P either), P had some reason or set of reasons R1 for undertaking S1, and some reason or set of reasons R2 for undertaking S2, and so on for not just S3 but C as well. In considering those reasons, we might find that although to an extent they can be broken down a little into "reasons why the reasons hold", at some point they become irreducible: P, given the full context of his/her situation, simply ''holistically and contingently chooses C for the given reasons''. At that level, the choice cannot be broken down any further.
 
A full accounting of free will allows that these reasons are to an extent ''themselves'' freely (contingently) chosen, and thus neither the choice ''nor'' its reasons are ''necessitated''. In other words, we are, to an extent, free to contingently "choose why we choose what we choose". There is a sense of circularity or endless recursion to this, but that is why the word "holistically" from the previous paragraph is especially relevant.


Now, even though, hopefully, the preceding has opened up to some readers the possibility of contingent events (choices in particular) compatible with genuine free will, an external resource which might also be of assistance in this respect is:
Now, even though, hopefully, the preceding has opened up to some readers the possibility of contingent events (choices in particular) compatible with genuine free will, an external resource which might also be of assistance in this respect is:
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