In defence of free will: Difference between revisions

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Now, by basic logic (the law of excluded middle) and syntax it is easy to see that "deterministic versus indeterministic" is a genuinely mutually exclusive dichotomy, however, a little insight leads to the conclusion that the dichotomy "necessitated versus random" is not. It has a gap in it - a gap into which a third option compatible with free will slots. Something has gone missing in translation.

That missing third option covers those events for which we can say that although the event happened due to some cause, it did not "have to" happen because of that cause; it simply "did" happen because of that cause.

That missing third option covers those events for which we can say that although the event happened due to some cause, it did not "have to" happen because of that cause; it simply "did" happen because of that cause. A suitable term for this third option, borrowing from its definition in logic, is "contingent". In logic, a proposition whose truth is "contingent" is one which, while true, is not true ''necessarily''; it "just so happens" to be true. Here, we apply "contingent" not to logical propositions but to causal outcomes or processes. Note that we specifically and explicitly exclude the ordinary sense of "contingent" as "subject to chance": indeed, we contrast our use of contingent ''against'' that concept (as well as against the concept of "necessitation").

~~How to refer to this concept though?~~

~~===~~ A ~~terminological aside ===~~

~~The best~~ term ~~to use~~ for this third option is ~~not obvious~~. ~~Some possibilities are:~~

* ''Contingent''. This term has the advantage of not implying consciousness, ~~so that it is applicable more broadly to causality than in the case of freely willed (conscious) choices. It has the disadvantage though that one of its sense~~ is "~~subject to chance~~"~~, which~~ is one ~~of the concepts we are trying to use it to contrast against, not to include. The sense on~~ which ~~we would be relying instead is "dependent [on something prior to it]"~~, ~~however~~, ~~another disadvantage of this term is that in the context of this article a further non-standard stipulation needs to be added to that sense: that the dependency~~ is not ~~one of necessitation.~~

* ''~~Dispositional~~''~~. This term has the advantage that~~ it ~~is in use in the philosophical literature~~. ~~It has the disadvantage though that~~, ~~like one of the senses of~~ "contingent"~~, it could be seen~~ to ~~imply too much of a sense of randomness against which we are trying rather~~ to ~~contrast:~~ that the ~~causal process is not definitive but just~~ "~~tends towards~~" ~~an expression which otherwise is~~ subject to chance.

* ''~~Preferential~~''~~. This term has~~ the ~~advantage~~ of being explicitly relevant to free will in the sense that only conscious agents have preferences, and only conscious agents can exercise free will. That, though, is also its disadvantage, since it seems to exclude non-conscious entities from the "~~third option~~" ~~causality which we are positing.~~

~~Since ''contingent'' was the term first used in this article, and since there seems no good basis on which to switch to either of the others, we'll stick with it in that which follows~~.

=== Why accept contingent causality? ===

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 Now, by basic logic (the law of excluded middle) and syntax it is easy to see that "deterministic versus indeterministic" is a genuinely mutually exclusive dichotomy, however, a little insight leads to the conclusion that the dichotomy "necessitated versus random" is not. It has a gap in it - a gap into which a third option compatible with free will slots. Something has gone missing in translation.
-That missing third option covers those events for which we can say that although the event happened due to some cause, it did not "have to" happen because of that cause; it simply "did" happen because of that cause.
+That missing third option covers those events for which we can say that although the event happened due to some cause, it did not "have to" happen because of that cause; it simply "did" happen because of that cause. A suitable term for this third option, borrowing from its definition in logic, is "contingent". In logic, a proposition whose truth is "contingent" is one which, while true, is not true ''necessarily''; it "just so happens" to be true. Here, we apply "contingent" not to logical propositions but to causal outcomes or processes. Note that we specifically and explicitly exclude the ordinary sense of "contingent" as "subject to chance": indeed, we contrast our use of contingent ''against'' that concept (as well as against the concept of "necessitation").
-How to refer to this concept though?
-=== A terminological aside ===
-The best term to use for this third option is not obvious. Some possibilities are:
-* ''Contingent''. This term has the advantage of not implying consciousness, so that it is applicable more broadly to causality than in the case of freely willed (conscious) choices. It has the disadvantage though that one of its sense is "subject to chance", which is one of the concepts we are trying to use it to contrast against, not to include. The sense on which we would be relying instead is "dependent [on something prior to it]", however, another disadvantage of this term is that in the context of this article a further non-standard stipulation needs to be added to that sense: that the dependency is not one of necessitation.
-* ''Dispositional''. This term has the advantage that it is in use in the philosophical literature. It has the disadvantage though that, like one of the senses of "contingent", it could be seen to imply too much of a sense of randomness against which we are trying rather to contrast: that the causal process is not definitive but just "tends towards" an expression which otherwise is subject to chance.
-* ''Preferential''. This term has the advantage of being explicitly relevant to free will in the sense that only conscious agents have preferences, and only conscious agents can exercise free will. That, though, is also its disadvantage, since it seems to exclude non-conscious entities from the "third option" causality which we are positing.
-Since ''contingent'' was the term first used in this article, and since there seems no good basis on which to switch to either of the others, we'll stick with it in that which follows.
 === Why accept contingent causality? ===