In defence of free will: Difference between revisions

m →‎Refuting the argument from incompatibility with a mutually exclusive dichotomy: Corrected the placement of the opening square bracket of the previous commit.
→‎Refuting the argument from incompatibility with a mutually exclusive dichotomy: Improved the added clarification re the sense of "contingent" being used.
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Now, by basic logic (the law of excluded middle) and syntax it is easy to see that "deterministic versus indeterministic" is a genuinely mutually exclusive dichotomy, however, a little insight leads to the conclusion that the dichotomy "necessitated versus random" is not. It has a gap in it - a gap into which a third option compatible with free will slots. Something has gone missing in translation.
Now, by basic logic (the law of excluded middle) and syntax it is easy to see that "deterministic versus indeterministic" is a genuinely mutually exclusive dichotomy, however, a little insight leads to the conclusion that the dichotomy "necessitated versus random" is not. It has a gap in it - a gap into which a third option compatible with free will slots. Something has gone missing in translation.


That missing third option is "contingent". This covers those events for which we can say that although the event happened due to some cause, it did not "have to" happen because of that cause; it simply "did" happen because of that cause. (Note that, as this implies, "contingent" is being used here not in its sense as "subject to chance" but in its sense as "dependent [on something prior to it]").
That missing third option is "contingent". This covers those events for which we can say that although the event happened due to some cause, it did not "have to" happen because of that cause; it simply "did" happen because of that cause. (Note that, as this implies, "contingent" is being used here not in its sense as "subject to chance" but in its sense as "dependent [on something prior to it]", and that, again as implied, in the context of this article a further non-standard stipulation is added: that the dependency is not one of necessitation).


Initially, this possibility might seem difficult to accept. It might be tempting to ask: if an effect is an outcome of a cause, then shouldn't that cause ''always'' and ''necessarily'' produce that effect? How could there be such a thing as a cause that doesn't ''have to'' produce a given effect?
Initially, this possibility might seem difficult to accept. It might be tempting to ask: if an effect is an outcome of a cause, then shouldn't that cause ''always'' and ''necessarily'' produce that effect? How could there be such a thing as a cause that doesn't ''have to'' produce a given effect?