In defence of free will: Difference between revisions

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If we return to our common-sense understanding of agency, we can identify a potential enforcer of nomological necessity: conscious agency. We know from our own experience that we and others, as conscious agents, are capable of "making things happen"; of implementing and enforcing laws. It is then possible that physical reality owes its existence to one or more conscious agents who - by choice and force of will - provide "the laws of physics" with their reliability and apparent nomological necessity.

So, whilst contingency might be hard to accept when we are conditioned by technology to see the world in terms of lawful necessity, that very necessity itself might owe its existence to contingency. In other words, in asking our tempting questions, we might have gotten hold of the wrong end of the stick. ~~Even if~~ not, the ~~preceding~~ might ~~help~~ to ~~lever open~~ in some readers~~' minds~~ the possibility of contingent events (choices in particular) compatible with genuine free will.

So, whilst contingency might be hard to accept when we are conditioned by technology to see the world in terms of lawful necessity, that very necessity itself might owe its existence to contingency. In other words, in asking our tempting questions, we might have gotten hold of the wrong end of the stick.

Regardless, though, of the nature of the relationship between contingency and necessity: as intimated in the Presumption section above, we do have good reason to believe in the existence of contingency as a "third option" which makes free will possible, in that most of us ''experience'' our choices as neither forced nor arbitrary, and yet as meaningfully causally connected to both our person and the environment - both external and internal - in which our person exists. Such (freely willed) choices can readily be accurately described as ''causally contingent''. In other words: whilst the effect of our choices is both ''caused and conditioned'' by both our person and the environment in which our person exists, the effect of our choices is not ''necessitated'' by either of those factors; we ''could'' in a meaningful rather than merely hypothetical sense have (again: ''contingently'') chosen differently.

A (set of) question(s) that often comes up at this point is:

:But ''how'' are these choices made? We have a person and that person's environment as "cause" (eliding for convenience the distinction between causes and conditions), and then we have the choice's outcome as "effect". Surely, though, there is some sort of ''process'' by which the choice is made; some way of ''breaking it down'' into a series of steps?

One plausible answer is that, whilst a decision often ''can'' be broken down into a series of steps (as introspection reveals), at a certain point, the decision simply becomes irreducible. In this sense, the decision is simply an ''holistic'' function of a person's will given the context in which s/he finds him/herself. We might observe, for example, that in deciding to choose to do C, person P took the steps S1, followed by S2, and then S3, in which S1 was a consideration of the options available, S2 was a narrowing down of options, and S3 was the - potentially provisional - commitment to one of the options - the choice itself. In considering S3, we might find that although to an extent it can be broken down a little, at some point it becomes irreducible: the person, given the full context of his/her situation, simply ''holistically and contingently makes the choice''. At that level, the choice cannot be broken down any further.

Notice that whilst that irreducible choice itself could have been made otherwise (and thus is not ''necessitated''), it is also not disconnected from the context - both inner and outer to the chooser - in which it occurs (and thus is not ''arbitrary''): indeed, unless the chooser ''freely chooses'' to make an explicitly "random" choice, the decision is made in part on the basis of - and thus is causally (though, through the person's will, contingently) connected to - that context.

Now, even though, hopefully, the preceding has opened up to some readers the possibility of contingent events (choices in particular) compatible with genuine free will, an external resource which might also be of assistance in this respect is:

~~An external resource which might further lever open that possibility is:~~

* [http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/freewill1.htm Lecture Notes on Free Will and Determinism] by Professor Norman Swartz.

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 If we return to our common-sense understanding of agency, we can identify a potential enforcer of nomological necessity: conscious agency. We know from our own experience that we and others, as conscious agents, are capable of "making things happen"; of implementing and enforcing laws. It is then possible that physical reality owes its existence to one or more conscious agents who - by choice and force of will - provide "the laws of physics" with their reliability and apparent nomological necessity.
-So, whilst contingency might be hard to accept when we are conditioned by technology to see the world in terms of lawful necessity, that very necessity itself might owe its existence to contingency. In other words, in asking our tempting questions, we might have gotten hold of the wrong end of the stick. Even if not, the preceding might help to lever open in some readers' minds the possibility of contingent events (choices in particular) compatible with genuine free will.
+So, whilst contingency might be hard to accept when we are conditioned by technology to see the world in terms of lawful necessity, that very necessity itself might owe its existence to contingency. In other words, in asking our tempting questions, we might have gotten hold of the wrong end of the stick.
+Regardless, though, of the nature of the relationship between contingency and necessity: as intimated in the Presumption section above, we do have good reason to believe in the existence of contingency as a "third option" which makes free will possible, in that most of us ''experience'' our choices as neither forced nor arbitrary, and yet as meaningfully causally connected to both our person and the environment - both external and internal - in which our person exists. Such (freely willed) choices can readily be accurately described as ''causally contingent''. In other words: whilst the effect of our choices is both ''caused and conditioned'' by both our person and the environment in which our person exists, the effect of our choices is not ''necessitated'' by either of those factors; we ''could'' in a meaningful rather than merely hypothetical sense have (again: ''contingently'') chosen differently.
+A (set of) question(s) that often comes up at this point is:
+:But ''how'' are these choices made? We have a person and that person's environment as "cause" (eliding for convenience the distinction between causes and conditions), and then we have the choice's outcome as "effect". Surely, though, there is some sort of ''process'' by which the choice is made; some way of ''breaking it down'' into a series of steps?
+One plausible answer is that, whilst a decision often ''can'' be broken down into a series of steps (as introspection reveals), at a certain point, the decision simply becomes irreducible. In this sense, the decision is simply an ''holistic'' function of a person's will given the context in which s/he finds him/herself. We might observe, for example, that in deciding to choose to do C, person P took the steps S1, followed by S2, and then S3, in which S1 was a consideration of the options available, S2 was a narrowing down of options, and S3 was the - potentially provisional - commitment to one of the options - the choice itself. In considering S3, we might find that although to an extent it can be broken down a little, at some point it becomes irreducible: the person, given the full context of his/her situation, simply ''holistically and contingently makes the choice''. At that level, the choice cannot be broken down any further.
+Notice that whilst that irreducible choice itself could have been made otherwise (and thus is not ''necessitated''), it is also not disconnected from the context - both inner and outer to the chooser - in which it occurs (and thus is not ''arbitrary''): indeed, unless the chooser ''freely chooses'' to make an explicitly "random" choice, the decision is made in part on the basis of - and thus is causally (though, through the person's will, contingently) connected to - that context.
+Now, even though, hopefully, the preceding has opened up to some readers the possibility of contingent events (choices in particular) compatible with genuine free will, an external resource which might also be of assistance in this respect is:
-An external resource which might further lever open that possibility is:
 * [http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/freewill1.htm Lecture Notes on Free Will and Determinism] by Professor Norman Swartz.