In defence of free will: Difference between revisions

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== Presumption ==

Whilst there do exist those who claim that they cannot introspectively confirm their own free agency, or even that their own agency appears introspectively to not be free, they seem to be a minority. Too, the existence of free will is assumed in Western (all?) legal systems and is the common sense view amongst the general population. For these reasons, this page starts with a presumption of free will, and places the burden of proof on free will skeptics. It then critically analyses and refutes the primary argument against free will presented by Psience Quest's free will skeptics.

Whilst there do exist those who claim that they cannot introspectively confirm their own free agency, or even that their own agency appears introspectively to not be free, they seem to be a minority. Too, the existence of free will is assumed in Western (all?) legal systems and is the common-sense view amongst the general population. For these reasons, this page starts with a presumption of free will, and places the burden of proof on free will skeptics. It then critically analyses and refutes the primary argument against free will presented by Psience Quest's free will skeptics.

== Refuting the argument from incompatibility with a mutually exclusive dichotomy ==

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We seem, then, to have only half of the story: we have some "physical stuff" which is "forced" to behave in a certain way, but we don't have any account of ''why'' it is forced to behave in that way or ''what'' forces it. Our tempting skeptical questions have led to equally skeptical questions in the reverse direction. One potential resolution to this second set of questions is suggestive:

If we return to our common sense understanding of agency, we can identify a potential enforcer of nomological necessity: conscious agency. We know from our own experience that we and others, as conscious agents, are capable of "making things happen"; of implementing and enforcing laws. It is then possible that physical reality owes its existence to one or more conscious agents who - by choice and force of will - provide "the laws of physics" with their reliability and apparent nomological necessity.

If we return to our common-sense understanding of agency, we can identify a potential enforcer of nomological necessity: conscious agency. We know from our own experience that we and others, as conscious agents, are capable of "making things happen"; of implementing and enforcing laws. It is then possible that physical reality owes its existence to one or more conscious agents who - by choice and force of will - provide "the laws of physics" with their reliability and apparent nomological necessity.

So, whilst contingency might be hard to accept when we are conditioned by technology to see the world in terms of lawful necessity, that very necessity itself might owe its existence to contingency. In other words, in asking our tempting questions, we might have gotten hold of the wrong end of the stick. Even if not, the preceding might help to lever open in some readers' minds the possibility of contingent events (choices in particular) compatible with genuine free will.

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 == Presumption ==
-Whilst there do exist those who claim that they cannot introspectively confirm their own free agency, or even that their own agency appears introspectively to not be free, they seem to be a minority. Too, the existence of free will is assumed in Western (all?) legal systems and is the common sense view amongst the general population. For these reasons, this page starts with a presumption of free will, and places the burden of proof on free will skeptics. It then critically analyses and refutes the primary argument against free will presented by Psience Quest's free will skeptics.
+Whilst there do exist those who claim that they cannot introspectively confirm their own free agency, or even that their own agency appears introspectively to not be free, they seem to be a minority. Too, the existence of free will is assumed in Western (all?) legal systems and is the common-sense view amongst the general population. For these reasons, this page starts with a presumption of free will, and places the burden of proof on free will skeptics. It then critically analyses and refutes the primary argument against free will presented by Psience Quest's free will skeptics.
 == Refuting the argument from incompatibility with a mutually exclusive dichotomy ==
@@ Line 31: / Line 31: @@
 We seem, then, to have only half of the story: we have some "physical stuff" which is "forced" to behave in a certain way, but we don't have any account of ''why'' it is forced to behave in that way or ''what'' forces it. Our tempting skeptical questions have led to equally skeptical questions in the reverse direction. One potential resolution to this second set of questions is suggestive:
-If we return to our common sense understanding of agency, we can identify a potential enforcer of nomological necessity: conscious agency. We know from our own experience that we and others, as conscious agents, are capable of "making things happen"; of implementing and enforcing laws. It is then possible that physical reality owes its existence to one or more conscious agents who - by choice and force of will - provide "the laws of physics" with their reliability and apparent nomological necessity.
+If we return to our common-sense understanding of agency, we can identify a potential enforcer of nomological necessity: conscious agency. We know from our own experience that we and others, as conscious agents, are capable of "making things happen"; of implementing and enforcing laws. It is then possible that physical reality owes its existence to one or more conscious agents who - by choice and force of will - provide "the laws of physics" with their reliability and apparent nomological necessity.
 So, whilst contingency might be hard to accept when we are conditioned by technology to see the world in terms of lawful necessity, that very necessity itself might owe its existence to contingency. In other words, in asking our tempting questions, we might have gotten hold of the wrong end of the stick. Even if not, the preceding might help to lever open in some readers' minds the possibility of contingent events (choices in particular) compatible with genuine free will.