View source for In defence of free will

== Contextualisation ==

There is, on the Psience Quest forum (see [https://psiencequest.net/forums/thread-neuroscience-and-free-will here] and [https://psiencequest.net/forums/thread-the-solution-to-the-problem-of-the-freedom-of-the-will here]), as on its sister forum Skeptiko (see [http://www.skeptiko-forum.com/threads/index-of-skeptiko-threads-related-resources.3851/#nature-of-mind-free-will-versus-hard-determinism here]), an ongoing debate over the existence of free will. This debate arises naturally out of the core subject matter of Psience Quest, parapsychology, in that the findings of parapsychology challenge physicalism, on which it is difficult to give an account of free will. On a physicalist account, consciousness is either non-existent or fully reducible to the physical, and thus cannot be meaningfully free in the sense required for the exercise of free will.

This page attempts to summarise the debate from the perspective of a defender of the existence of free will. Psience Quest's free will skeptics are invited to create their own page summarising their case against free will should they care to.

== Presumption ==

Whilst there do exist those who claim that they cannot introspectively confirm their own free agency, or even that their own agency appears introspectively to not be free, they seem to be a minority. Too, the existence of free will is assumed in Western (all?) legal systems and is the common-sense view amongst the general population. For these reasons, this page starts with a presumption of free will, and places the burden of proof on free will skeptics. It then critically analyses and refutes the primary argument against free will presented by Psience Quest's free will skeptics.

== Refuting the argument from incompatibility with a mutually exclusive dichotomy ==

As the notion of quantum indeterminacy from quantum mechanics has become more entrenched, the science-loving hard determinists of old have had to give up the notion that reality is fully deterministic. Many free will skeptics though have simply adapted the argument from the incompatibility of free will with a deterministic reality into an argument from the incompatibility of free will with reality's mutually exclusive dichotomy. Colloquially, that argument goes something like this:

:''Events in reality are either deterministic or indeterministic. If they are deterministic, then they had to happen, and thus they aren't free. If they are indeterministic, then they are random (arbitrary), and thus beyond the control of any agent. In both cases, they are incompatible with free will. Ergo, free will does not exist.''

Superficially, the argument seems persuasive. Let's take a closer look though to see why we shouldn't be persuaded.

Notice that the dichotomy between "deterministic versus indeterministic" events has been translated into a dichotomy between "events that had to happen versus events that are random (arbitrary)", or, in other words, "necessitated versus random" events.

Now, by basic logic (the law of excluded middle) and syntax it is easy to see that "deterministic versus indeterministic" is a genuinely mutually exclusive dichotomy, however, a little insight leads to the conclusion that the dichotomy "necessitated versus random" is not. It has a gap in it - a gap into which a third option compatible with free will slots. Something has gone missing in translation.

That missing third option is "contingent". This covers those events for which we can say that although the event happened due to some cause, it did not "have to" happen because of that cause; it simply "did" happen because of that cause.

Initially, this possibility might seem difficult to accept. It might be tempting to ask: if an effect is an outcome of a cause, then shouldn't that cause ''always'' and ''necessarily'' produce that effect? How could there be such a thing as a cause that doesn't ''have to'' produce a given effect?

These questions are tempting to ask because of the triumph of science in modelling reality to the extent that we have been able to, such that we have developed highly sophisticated, and, more importantly, highly ''reliable'' technology based on our models of reality. You can't build reliable technology unless predictable outcomes are in some sense guaranteed or necessitated.

The sense of necessity implied here though is nomological: that is, "lawful" necessity. This is a weaker sense of necessity than logical necessity, and it leaves open an interesting question: in virtue of ''what'' is any lawful causal relation necessitated? For logical necessity, we have a ready answer: in virtue of its being true in every possible world, or, in other words, in virtue of its negation entailing a contradiction. We do not have a similarly ready answer for nomological necessity.

We seem, then, to have only half of the story: we have some "physical stuff" which is "forced" to behave in a certain way, but we don't have any account of ''why'' it is forced to behave in that way or ''what'' forces it. Our tempting skeptical questions have led to equally skeptical questions in the reverse direction. One potential resolution to this second set of questions is suggestive:

If we return to our common-sense understanding of agency, we can identify a potential enforcer of nomological necessity: conscious agency. We know from our own experience that we and others, as conscious agents, are capable of "making things happen"; of implementing and enforcing laws. It is then possible that physical reality owes its existence to one or more conscious agents who - by choice and force of will - provide "the laws of physics" with their reliability and apparent nomological necessity.

So, whilst contingency might be hard to accept when we are conditioned by technology to see the world in terms of lawful necessity, that very necessity itself might owe its existence to contingency. In other words, in asking our tempting questions, we might have gotten hold of the wrong end of the stick. Even if not, the preceding might help to lever open in some readers' minds the possibility of contingent events (choices in particular) compatible with genuine free will.

An external resource which might further lever open that possibility is Professor Norman Swartz's [http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/freewill1.htm Lecture Notes on Free Will and Determinism].

== The positive case for free will ==

A positive case for free will has also been presented in debates on the forum. For now though, this page simply refers to an external resource which makes that case. Other members are invited to fill out this skeletal section if and as they see fit.

*[https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/how-can-i-possibly-be-free How Can I Possibly Be Free? Why the neuroscientific case against free will is wrong] by Raymond Tallis