2018-12-27, 05:38 PM
2018-12-27, 06:56 PM
From the Sci-Am article:
Do we know that much?
It seems odd to admit this is a matter of dispute and then claim authority on knowing volition and the rest are illusions. In fact the title seems a misnomer, given:
Beyond that this seems to tread familiar ground, though I'd say it's important to realize consciousness includes Intentionality and Rationality as per Fodor's trinity. The latter two are just [as] involve[d] in decision making as subjectivity, so simply reporting on our own states would leave the picture of our minds unfinished.
edit: I should say reporting on our own thoughts (specifically their aboutness + determinate nature) as well as our subjectivity. It isn't enough to report mental states without giving an account for their very existence. Even Idealist accounts can be lacking here.
Quote:I think we already know a lot about how and where working memory is represented in the brain.
Do we know that much?
Quote:Our philosophical concepts of what consciousness actually is are much more informed by empirical work than they were even a few decades ago. Whether we can ever close the gap between subjective experiences and neurophysiological processes that produce them is still a matter of dispute.
It seems odd to admit this is a matter of dispute and then claim authority on knowing volition and the rest are illusions. In fact the title seems a misnomer, given:
Quote:Conscious and unconscious are not separate spheres; they operate in tandem. We are not simply puppets manipulated by our unconscious thoughts, because obviously, conscious reflection does have effects on our behavior.
Beyond that this seems to tread familiar ground, though I'd say it's important to realize consciousness includes Intentionality and Rationality as per Fodor's trinity. The latter two are just [as] involve[d] in decision making as subjectivity, so simply reporting on our own states would leave the picture of our minds unfinished.
edit: I should say reporting on our own thoughts (specifically their aboutness + determinate nature) as well as our subjectivity. It isn't enough to report mental states without giving an account for their very existence. Even Idealist accounts can be lacking here.